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For years, states have been using illusory schemes to maximize 
federal aid intended for Medicaid services—and then often diverting 
some or all of the resulting funds to other use.1 And states have help. Pri-
vate revenue maximization consultants are hired by states to increase 
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Medicaid claims, often for a contingency fee. We do not know the exact 
amount of federal Medicaid funds that has been diverted to state revenue 
and private profit each year, but it is in the billions.2 
The states’ revenue strategies take advantage of the matching-grant 
structure of the Medicaid program. When state funds are spent on eligi-
ble health care services, the state can then claim federal Medicaid match-
ing funds—intended to increase the amount of money available for the 
Medicaid services. For example, Maryland has a fifty percent match per-
centage for the Medicaid program.3 So when Maryland spends $500 dol-
lars on eligible services, the state can claim another $500 from the feder-
al government—for a total of $1,000 intended for health care for the 
poor. 
Unfortunately, the revenue strategies developed by states and their 
contractors often subvert the intended match structure by claiming feder-
al Medicaid matching grant funds without any actual state spending. A 
state might use budget maneuvers such as providing funds to a hospital 
serving the poor while simultaneously requiring the hospital to give the 
money back.4 Although no state spending actually occurs, the state may 
still use the round-trip of state money to claim the federal matching 
funds. In addition to the illusory nature of the claims, much of the result-
ing federal aid funds are then often diverted into general state coffers 
rather than used for Medicaid purposes. The U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) explains: “[W]e designated Medicaid to be a pro-
gram at high risk of mismanagement, waste, and abuse, in part due to 
concerns about states’ use of inappropriate financing arrangements.”5 
In a time when Democrats and Republicans are seemingly unable to 
agree on anything, states have reached bipartisan political consensus on 
the practice of taking aid funds from the poor. Because an anti-tax cli-
mate exists in both red states and blue states, the states have looked 
elsewhere for revenue and Medicaid maximization schemes have become 
increasingly common. A 2007 GAO report explains the scope: 
GAO has reported for more than a decade on varied financing ar-
rangements that inappropriately increase federal Medicaid matching 
payments. In reports issued from 1994 through 2005, GAO found 
that some states had received federal matching funds by paying cer-
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tain government providers, such as county operated nursing homes, 
amounts that greatly exceeded established Medicaid rates. States 
would then bill [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services] 
for the federal share of the payment. However, these large payments 
were often temporary, since some states required the providers to 
return most or all of the amount. States used the federal matching 
funds obtained in making these payments as they wished. Such fi-
nancing arrangements had significant fiscal implications for the 
federal government and states. The exact amount of additional fed-
eral Medicaid funds generated through these arrangements is un-
known, but was in the billions of dollars.6 
Irony also exists in state practices regarding Medicaid funds. While 
using strategies to divert the federal aid from its intended purpose, states 
are also seeking to reduce Medicaid fraud at the state level. States have 
increased their efforts to prosecute doctors and other health care provid-
ers who use false and illusory claims for the Medicaid funds from the 
states. However, while trying to deter the fraudulent practices of health 
care providers seeking to misuse Medicaid funds from the states, the 
states continue to use their own illusory practices to divert Medicaid 
funds from the federal government. 
Part I of this Article sets out the structure of the Medicaid program 
and describes states’ use of revenue maximization contractors to assist in 
their Medicaid revenue strategies. Part II describes details of the numer-
ous revenue strategies states have developed to claim increased federal 
Medicaid funds through illusory means and how the funds are then di-
verted to state revenue. In Part III, the Article describes how the revenue 
practices conflict with the statutory purpose of the Medicaid program. 
The Article concludes with suggestions to curb the illusory revenue strat-
egies and to better ensure that Medicaid funds truly assist the vulnerable 
populations in need of such services. 
I. MEDICAID PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND REVENUE MAXIMIZATION 
CONSULTANTS 
Congress enacted the Medicaid program in 1965 “to make medical 
services for the needy more generally available.”7 Medicaid is the largest 
federal grant-in-aid program, accounting for forty percent of total federal 
funds provided to states.8 Medicaid is often described as an entitlement 
program and includes two forms of entitlements: individuals who meet 
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the Medicaid eligibility requirements are entitled to coverage, and states 
are entitled to federal matching funds after spending state funds on eligi-
ble services for enrolled individuals.9 Individuals enrolled in the program 
do not directly receive any Medicaid payments to pay for their health 
care. Instead, when a health care provider provides an individual with 
Medicaid-eligible services, the provider will then bill the state Medicaid 
agency for the services.10 It is those state payments to the health care 
providers that then entitle the states to federal matching payments. States 
can seek matching funds for the medical services and can also seek fed-
eral Medicaid funds for various administrative costs. 
Structured under the economic theory of fiscal federalism, state 
agencies run the Medicaid programs and the federal government pro-
vides funding assistance and regulatory oversight.11 States that spend 
their own funds on Medicaid services can receive match payments from 
the federal government to increase their total health care spending for 
low-income residents.12 The match percentage states receive from the 
federal government is based on a formula called the federal medical as-
sistance percentage (FMAP). The FMAP varies based on the relative 
wealth of each state.13 For example, Massachusetts has a fifty percent 
FMAP and Mississippi has an FMAP of almost seventy-five percent 
(meaning, if Mississippi spends $25 on eligible services, the state can 
claim $75 in federal Medicaid matching funds).14 
The federal matching funds are also described as federal financial 
participation (FFP) and are designed to encourage states to spend more 
state funds on eligible services.15 If a state spends more of its own funds 
on covered services, the state can claim more federal matching funds at 
the state’s associated FMAP. 
Private revenue maximization consultants often help states with 
Medicaid claiming at every stage of the process—seeking to both in-
crease the federal matching funds while also decrease payouts to health 
care providers. Some health care providers, such as hospital systems, will 
also hire their own revenue maximization consultants to help increase 
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Medicaid payments from the states.16 Then, the states often hire private 
contractors to audit the claims from health care providers—seeking to 
reduce incorrect or fraudulent payouts.17 As the states hire contractors to 
reduce Medicaid payments to providers, the states often simultaneously 
hire contractors to maximize their claims for Medicaid matching funds 
from the federal government.18 While the states use contractors to claim 
federal Medicaid funds, the federal government in turn often hires pri-
vate contractors to audit Medicaid claims—and additional contractors are 
often available to help respond to audits.19 
II. MEDICAID REVENUE STRATEGIES 
Often encouraged by their revenue maximization consultants, states 
have concocted numerous strategies to increase claims for federal Medi-
caid matching funds. The schemes vary in detail but include a common 
illusory theme: money is moved around to create the appearance of state 
spending in order to claim matching funds from the federal government, 
but no state spending actually occurs. And once the federal Medicaid 
dollars are claimed, the states often reroute the federal aid from Medicaid 
purposes to general state coffers. These revenue strategies create harm 
because they divert funds from those in need and undermine the intended 
partnership between the federal government and states in funding the 
Medicaid program. This Part describes several of the states’ revenue 
maximization schemes: intergovernmental transfers, upper payment lim-
its, quality assessment fees (or “bed taxes”), school-based Medicaid 
maximization, and nursing home revenue strategies. Further, this Part 
explains how federal government audit attempts have failed to keep up 
with these revenue strategies. 
A. Intergovernmental Transfers: State “Spending” Sleight of Hand 
States and their contractors have frequently used a category of 
Medicaid financing strategies termed “intergovernmental transfers” or 
IGTs. The IGT mechanism provides for a round-trip of state funds. For 
example, a state could provide a large payment to a health care provid-
er—such as a Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH), which serves a 
larger share of the poor than other hospitals. Such payment allows the 
state to claim federal Medicaid matching funds that are intended to be 
combined with the state spending on Medicaid services. However, once 
the federal match is claimed, the state might require the health care pro-
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vider to immediately return the initial state payment through an IGT. 
Thus, no state spending actually occurs, but the state retains the federal 
matching funds that result from this sleight of hand. The GAO describes 
the strategy as follows: 
In particular, these arrangements create the illusion that a state has 
made a large Medicaid payment . . . which enables the state to ob-
tain a federal matching payment. In reality, the large payment is 
temporary, since the funds essentially make a round-trip from the 
state to the Medicaid providers and back to the state. As a result of 
such round-trip arrangements, states obtain excessive federal Medi-
caid matching funds while their own state expenditures remain un-
changed or even decrease.20 
States have been using this IGT scheme for over twenty years. For 
example, in 1993, Michigan made payments of $122 million to county 
health facilities.21 Such payments triggered the claiming of $155 million 
in federal Medicaid matching funds, for a total of $277 million intended 
for Medicaid services by the health facilities.22 But on the very same day 
of the state payments to the health care facilities, the facilities transferred 
$271 million back to the state.23 Thus, the health care facilities only re-
tained $6 million—rather than the intended $277 million—and the state 
gained $149 million in general revenue by the illusory practice ($271 
million less $122 million initial state payment).24 
Some states have even forced counties to carry out the IGT strategy 
using bank loans. The counties took out bank loans, wired the money to 
the states, and the states would provide the money right back to the coun-
ties—but this time as “Medicaid payments.”25 Once receiving the pay-
ments, the counties repaid the bank loans, and the states claimed and re-
tained all the federal Medicaid matching funds.26 
These financing schemes have not gone unnoticed by the federal 
government, but states and their revenue maximization consultants have 
stayed one step ahead of any federal effort to clamp down on the practic-
es. The GAO explains, “As various schemes involving IGTs have come 
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to light, Congress and CMS have taken actions to curtail them, but as one 
approach has been restricted, others have often emerged.”27 
B. Upper Payment Limits: Federal Effort to Reduce Medicaid Schemes 
Turned into Mechanism for Expanded Medicaid Schemes 
As the federal government attempted to reduce the illusory financ-
ing schemes, states just created new strategies—even finding ways to 
exploit federal efforts to limit Medicaid claims. For example, the federal 
government started setting limits, called Upper Payment Limits (UPLs), 
on how much it will pay to match state Medicaid spending on eligible 
health care facilities. The UPLs are an attempt by the federal government 
to reduce states’ excessive and illusory claiming of federal Medicaid 
funds.28 But states and their contractors have turned the UPLs on their 
heads, using the mechanisms intended to reduce inappropriate Medicaid 
claims as a significant part of expanded illusory practices.29 
A hypothetical nursing home payment structure can help shed light 
on how states use the UPLs in their revenue strategies. The federal gov-
ernment might set a $150 UPL on a day of nursing home care. In re-
sponse, the state may significantly undercut the limitation—setting its 
payment rate for nursing homes to only $100 per day, as the cost for the 
actual services provided to a nursing home resident who is eligible for 
Medicaid. Then, the state can exploit the $50 gap between the UPL and 
actual state payments. 
To exploit the gap and carry out the UPL revenue scheme, the state 
could provide a supplemental (or enhanced) payment that is greater than 
the actual cost of medical services provided to a Medicaid beneficiary 
(which is the state’s normal Medicaid payment rate). The supplemental 
payment can be the amount between its normal payment and the UPL (so 
a $50 supplemental payment based on the example above). The state then 
claims federal Medicaid matching funds for the supplemental payment, 
forces the nursing home to return the supplemental payment to the state 
in the form of an IGT (since the supplemental payment is not for the ac-
tual cost of medical services), and the state keeps the federal matching 
funds.30 
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As with the traditional IGT strategies, the UPL scheme has allowed 
states to claim federal Medicaid matching funds without any actual state 
spending. Medicaid funds are supposed to be used for Medicaid purpos-
es, not for other state needs such as paying for a state’s education system, 
but states often use federal funds for other purposes. Oregon, New York, 
and Texas provide examples. Oregon’s Legislative Fiscal Office explains 
its UPL strategy in detail: 
The federal Medicaid Upper Payment Limit (MUPL) program al-
lows states to pay publicly affiliated nursing facilities a rate equal to 
the maximum Medicare rate for all Medicaid nursing facility clients 
in the state when the Medicare rate exceeds the rate the state would 
otherwise pay for Medicaid clients. This lets Oregon claim addi-
tional federal revenue at no added General Fund cost. The Depart-
ment of Human Services (DHS) implements the plan by making 
payments of General Fund and Federal Medicaid Funds to nine pub-
lic health districts that operate nursing facilities. The health districts 
immediately give all or most of the payment to the state through an 
intergovernmental transfer. After the health districts transfer the 
payment back to DHS, DHS deposits the Federal Funds portion of 
the original payment into a special MUPL account as Other Funds. 
These funds can be used to finance legislatively approved pro-
grams.31 
In summary, Oregon uses general fund money to make supplemental 
payments beyond the actual costs of medical care to nursing facilities in 
order to trigger the additional federal matching funds. The nursing facili-
ties “immediately give all or most of the payment [back] to the state 
through an intergovernmental transfer.”32 Then the state pockets the ad-
ditional federal funds. 
When Oregon first established this revenue strategy, it funneled all 
federal Medicaid funds into the state’s general revenue. In 2001, the state 
established targeted purposes for the MUPL account, but the bulk of the 
money was to be used for the state’s education system.33 A state docu-
ment explains that for the biennial budget beginning in 2001, the financ-
ing strategy would result in approximately $227.3 million in new federal 
Medicaid funds, and approximately ninety percent was to be rerouted 
away from Medicaid services to the state’s education system.34 Thus, 
Oregon’s maximization and diversion of federal Medicaid funds could 
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allow the state to free up state dollars that would have otherwise been 
required for education spending.35 
While some states like Oregon use the Medicaid funds resulting 
from such strategies for targeted non-Medicaid purposes, other states are 
even more aggressive in their deceit—using federal aid resulting from 
illusory schemes to claim even more federal aid using illusory schemes. 
By recycling the federal funds to claim more federal funds, these states 
have essentially developed a Ponzi scheme like that infamously used by 
Bernie Madoff. In fact, while New York prosecuted Madoff, the state 
had already employed a Madoff-like UPL strategy: “Funds generated by 
the state’s UPL arrangement were deposited into its Medical Assistance 
Account. Proceeds from this account were used to pay for the state share 
of the cost of Medicaid payments, effectively recycling federal funds to 
generate additional federal Medicaid matching funds.”36 
Hypocritical actions such as those in New York can be found else-
where, including Texas. It is not uncommon for politicians in Texas to 
express their dislike for federal aid programs, and former Governor Rick 
Perry is no exception. However, from 2008 to 2013, Perry used illusory 
IGT and UPL strategies like those described above to divert over $1.7 
billion in federal Medicaid matching funds to his general coffers.37 The 
intent of Medicaid’s matching structure is for states and the federal gov-
ernment to share in the cost of Medicaid services. But through Perry’s 
schemes, “Texas contributes no money and instead forces the state hospi-
tals to provide the state’s contribution, then takes the federal contribution 
for the general fund.”38 
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Texas’s diversion of federal Medicaid funds from the intended 
Medicaid services harmed the intended beneficiaries of the funds: “The 
practice discourages state hospitals from treating the poorest Texans.”39 
The funds were intended for hospitals serving the poor, but Texas took 
the money for its general coffers. With less aid funds, the state hospitals 
like the University of Texas Medical Branch had no choice but to reduce 
health care for the poor; the hospital “dramatically reduced the number 
of uninsured patients it cared for . . . dropping from 3,182 in 2008 to 233 
in 2011.”40 
The GAO, the federal government watchdog organization, explains 
the illusory nature of the revenue schemes such as those used in Texas. 
The GAO states the simple fact that Medicaid funds should be used for 
Medicaid purposes: “The U.S. Government Accountability Office, how-
ever, believes the money should be used for its intended purpose. ‘Our 
position is that Medicaid payments should be made for Medicaid services 
made to Medicaid patients,’ said Katherine Iritani, GAO director for 
health care issues.”41 
Concern regarding UPL revenue strategies is not new. The federal 
government has attempted for well over twenty years to clamp down on 
the illusory state schemes. But the practices continue to grow—and the 
numbers are not small. In 2011 alone, states reported making at least $43 
billion in supplemental payments (with $26 billion from UPL pay-
ments)—which represented over a thirty-four percent increase from $32 
billion in 2010.42 And such supplemental payments are the type used in 
the UPL schemes. 
The federal government does not sufficiently monitor the states re-
garding how they use these revenue maximization mechanisms or how 
they use the federal matching funds intended for Medicaid services. The 
GAO explained in 2012 that “[w]e and others have raised concerns about 
the need for improved transparency regarding the size of the payments 
and who receives them, as well as the need for improved accountability 
regarding how the funds are related to Medicaid services.”43 
Further, states are reacting to an incentive built into the UPL Medi-
caid maximization efforts—and their reaction is not good. If states re-
duce the amount of their regular payments to health care providers—and 
therefore reduce the quality of care—they can increase their exploitation 
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of the UPL strategies to divert more federal funds. Because states exploit 
UPLs by making supplemental payments between the gap of the UPL set 
by the federal government and the state payment amounts normally given 
to health care providers, if the states reduce their regular payment 
amounts, the gap will increase. The bigger the gap, the larger the sup-
plemental payments and the greater the amount of federal Medicaid 
matching funds claimed (and often diverted). Evidence unfortunately 
indicates that such a result is occurring. The GAO has reported that states 
are greatly increasing the amounts of these UPL payment strategies in 
recent years, and “[a]t the same time, we have reported that many states 
have reduced regular Medicaid payment rates in response to budgetary 
pressures.”44 
C. “Quality Assessment Fees,” a.k.a. “Bed Taxes” 
States use another form of revenue strategies to maximize federal 
Medicaid funds: tax schemes commonly called “bed taxes.” The strate-
gies are often labeled with more positive sounding terms such as “pro-
vider assessments,” “federal reimbursement allowances,” “Medicaid en-
hancement,” and “quality assessment fees.” 
The bed taxes are similar to IGT strategies, but the initial funding 
comes from the health care providers. With IGTs, states provide pay-
ments to the providers and then the providers send the money right back 
to the states—and the illusory payments are used to claim federal Medi-
caid matching funds. With bed taxes, the health care providers are taxed 
to raise the state money for the illusory spending.45 For example, a state 
could initiate a new tax on a health care facility, such as a nursing home 
(called a bed tax because the tax is based on the number of beds used for 
patients by the health care facility). The state places the tax dollars in a 
state trust fund for uncompensated care and claims the money as state 
Medicaid spending, triggering federal matching funds. Then, the state 
may pay the nursing home back for some, or all, of the cost of the bed 
tax through either direct payments or increased state Medicaid payment 
rates (so the taxes can often be temporary). 
Some states use the increased federal Medicaid funds from such 
bed tax strategies for health care purposes—including increasing pay-
ments to health care providers. But other states use much of the federal 
aid as general state revenue—such as Wisconsin, which diverted $13.8 
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million annually in bed tax scheme revenue from nursing homes into 
general revenue.46 
Mitt Romney used an identical scheme when he was governor of 
Massachusetts. Romney denounced federal aid in his past campaign for 
the presidency, including his “47 percent” comments about people on 
government assistance.47 But when he was governor, Romney pursued 
such federal government assistance and then took the money for his gen-
eral coffers.48 
Although Romney asserted in his 2004 budget that he was balanc-
ing the state budget without increasing taxes and “without the use of fis-
cal gimmicks,”49 the “outside sections” of his budget details included 
fiscal gimmicks in the form of bed tax schemes.50 
His gimmicks included taxing public hospitals and shifting money 
in and out of an uncompensated care trust fund, back to hospitals as ad-
justment payments, and diverting resulting federal Medicaid funds into 
his general coffers. Below is one example: 
[T]he division of medical assistance . . . shall take any appropriate 
action to obtain the maximum amount of federal financial participa-
tion available for amounts paid to hospitals, determined by the divi-
sion to be disproportionate share hospitals . . . . Such appropriate ac-
tion may include, but shall not be limited to, the assessment on hos-
pitals for their liability to the uncompensated care pool . . . . Such 
appropriate action shall include the establishment or renewal of an 
interdepartmental services agreement between the division and the 
division of health care finance and policy which may authorize the 
division to make deposits into and payments from an account estab-
lished for the purposes of this section within the Uncompensated 
Care Trust Fund, . . . or authorize the division of health care finance 
and policy to transfer uncompensated care fee revenue collected 
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fy2004h1/downloads/execsummary.pdf. 
 50. See infra notes 53–54. 
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from hospitals . . . to the division for the purposes of making dis-
proportionate share adjustment payments to hospitals qualifying for 
such payments . . . . In no event shall the amount of money assessed 
upon each hospital exceed the hospital’s gross liability to the un-
compensated care trust fund . . . . Any federal funds obtained as a 
result of said actions shall be deposited in the General Fund. 51 
In another section, he proposed the following: 
[T]he department of mental health, the department of public health, 
the division of medical assistance and the division of health care fi-
nance and policy shall take any appropriate action to obtain the 
maximum amount of federal financial participation available for 
amounts paid for low-income care costs at those mental health and 
public health facilities determined to be disproportionate share 
hospitals . . . . Such appropriate action may include, but shall not be 
limited to, the establishment of a separate account within the Un-
compensated Care Trust Fund, . . . for the purpose of making dis-
proportionate share payment adjustments to such qualifying mental 
health and public health facilities . . . . Any federal funds obtained 
as a result of actions taken pursuant to this section shall be deposit-
ed in the General Fund.52 
In addition to the above examples, Romney also proposed maximizing 
federal funds using mental health facilities, nursing homes, and pharma-
cies. Again, he suggested diverting the resulting tax revenue and federal 
Medicaid funds into his general state revenue.53 To help effectuate these 
strategies, Romney used revenue maximization contractors such as the 
Public Consulting Group (PCG).54 
In 2005, the GAO investigated the practices by Romney, and other 
states with such schemes, including the use of contingency-fee revenue 
maximization consultants, and concluded the revenue strategies were 
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inappropriate.55 The Romney administration defended the revenue 
schemes using such consultants, but the GAO explained “our concern 
was that hospitals should benefit from increased federal reimbursements 
and Massachusetts’s arrangement appeared to result in lower payments 
to hospitals, despite increased claims for federal reimbursement.”56 
As another example of a state bed tax scheme, Missouri’s former 
Governor John Ashcroft (Attorney General under George W. Bush) initi-
ated a bed tax strategy he labeled the “Hospital Federal Reimbursement 
Allowance” (FRA) program.57 Ashcroft’s illusory scheme used Medicaid 
funds as a revenue source—larger than Missouri’s inheritance/estate tax, 
corporate income tax, and county foreign income tax combined.58 
In legislation that Ashcroft signed into law in 1992, the statutory 
language explains how money taxed from hospitals can be used to claim 
federal Medicaid matching funds, and how the money can then be placed 
into a fund with the payments made by hospitals, and tagged for pay-
ments back to the hospitals: 
The director of the department of social services shall make 
a determination as to the amount of federal reimbursement 
allowance due from the various hospitals . . . 
. . . . 
The federal reimbursement allowance owed or, if an offset 
has been requested, the balance, if any, after such offset, 
shall be remitted by the hospital to the department of social 
services. The remittance shall be made payable to the direc-
tor of the department of revenue. The amount remitted shall 
be deposited in the state treasury to the credit of the “Fed-
eral Reimbursement Allowance Fund,” which is hereby 
created for the purpose of providing payments to hospi-
tals.59 
Further, the legislation describes how the purpose of the legislation is to 
claim more federal Medicaid matching funds: “The requirements . . . 
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shall apply only as long as the revenues generated under section 208.405, 
RSMo, are eligible for federal financial participation . . . .”60 
By 2009, the bed tax strategy resulted in $1.522 billion in federal 
Medicaid funds claimed by Missouri.61 The funds claimed through the 
illusory practice (no actual state spending) were not limited to spending 
on Medicaid services as intended, but much of the money was apparently 
directed towards health care related issues. Instead, the idea was to re-
place otherwise required state spending with federal spending: 
Throughout the highs and lows of the state’s financial condition, the 
program has evolved to maximize federal matching dollars and re-
duce the burden of [the state Medicaid program] on state general 
revenue . . . . [T]he FRA is a major source of revenue to the state, 
surpassing all but the two largest sources of general revenue . . . . 
This releases traditional general revenue to be used for other state 
priorities.62 
Missouri’s scheme has greatly increased its match rate. Missouri’s 
normal match rate is about thirty-seven percent to receive a sixty-three 
percent federal match. However, the Missouri bed tax strategy under-
mines the intended matching structure of the Medicaid program: 
“[b]ecause Missouri has pursued provider taxes aggressively to fund its 
program costs, nearly half of the state’s share of the cost of the Medicaid 
program comes from these provider taxes.”63 Since Missouri does not 
actually spend any state money in such tax strategies, “[o]nly 21 percent 
of the cost of the Medicaid program comes from general revenue 
funds.”64 Thus, the Missouri strategy leads the federal government to pay 
almost eighty percent of the state’s Medicaid program rather than the 
intended sixty-three percent. As a result, “vast amounts of general reve-
nue have been made available over the years to be spent on other state 
priorities.”65 And other states have surpassed Missouri’s example. For 
example, Alabama’s use of illusory Medicaid maximization schemes 
turned the state’s intended 2:1 match into a 9:1 match ($9 in federal 
Medicaid funds for every $1 of state spending).66 
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D. School-Based Medicaid Maximization Strategies 
In addition to using health care facilities, states have used disabled 
school children in schools in similar Medicaid maximization and diver-
sion strategies. States can claim federal Medicaid matching funds on be-
half of school children, for both certain health services and school ad-
ministrative costs. Eligible services include health services related to 
needs in special education, rehabilitative services, physical and speech 
therapy, and under Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, 
and Treatment (EPSDT) program.67 Eligible administrative costs can 
include costs for Medicaid outreach and education, enrollment assis-
tance, health care referrals, and other coordination of services. 
Again, states often employ revenue maximization consultants to 
help with their strategies to increase school-based federal Medicaid 
funds. Like with the other strategies, states often divert some of the fed-
eral aid away from the school children to general state revenue. Accord-
ing to the 2000 report by the GAO, at least eighteen states were diverting 
a portion of the Medicaid funds intended for disabled school children 
into state general revenue.68 Ten of those states diverted between forty to 
eighty-five percent of the federal aid, and many of the states used reve-
nue maximization contractors to increase claims for the funds.69 Further, 
some states have expanded their school-based Medicaid maximization 
strategies by digging backwards for retroactive claims. As one example, 
in addition to the eighteen states identified by the GAO, Maine retroac-
tively claimed $8.8 million in school-based federal Medicaid funds and 
then rerouted all of those funds into to the state’s general coffers to help 
balance the state budget.70 The Inspector General’s Office for the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services concluded: 
Federal regulations stipulate that (1) it is the State’s responsibility to 
make payments to providers that furnish Medicaid services . . . . 
The State agency did not follow Federal regulations when it 
processed the retroactive claims for Medicaid school-based health 
services. The State did not incur any expenditures because it did not 
remit the Federal share received for those claims to the provider 
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school districts. Rather, the State deposited the Federal share in the 
State’s general fund.71 
The following examples provide some additional insight of how states 
use impoverished, disabled school children in revenue strategies. 
In Michigan, the state’s use of a contractor to help with efforts to 
maximize school-based Medicaid funds led to pay-for-play concerns. 
Michigan shifted over $100 million of the federal Medicaid funds to its 
general revenue, and nonetheless required school districts to pay for the 
services of the revenue contractor.72 The contractor received twenty per-
cent of the federal aid as payment for its services and the school districts 
only received about $4 out of every $10 in federal aid intended to help 
the schools provide needed Medicaid related services to children.73 As 
such, Michigan was diverting much of the federal aid resulting from the 
revenue maximization contract. 
Along with diverting federal aid away from educational institutions, 
the state also faced scrutiny regarding improper gifts. According to the 
GAO, while Michigan contracted with Deloitte to maximize claims for 
the school-based Medicaid, Deloitte was providing gratuities and gifts to 
government officials responsible for the contracts: 
In our April 2000 report,
 
we discussed the circumstances sur-
rounding the process used by a consortium of eight Michigan inter-
mediate school districts to contract with Deloitte Consulting LLC 
for consulting and billing services. 
. . . . 
We conducted an investigation and determined that Deloitte had 
provided gratuities, including meals and tickets to professional 
sporting and theater events, to the school district officials responsi-
ble for awarding the contract for consulting services. Records pro-
vided to us by Deloitte show that it spent over $170,000 for the gra-
tuities from l997 through 1999. Officials receiving the gratuities in-
cluded members of the school district consortium’s Medicaid Pro-
gram Steering Committee and Contract Negotiation Committee.74 
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Because such gifts or gratuities can be prohibited if made to influence 
business transactions with government agencies, the GAO referred the 
matter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.75 
Like other states, New York has diverted about half of school-based 
Medicaid funds to general state revenue—over $170 million annually.76 
New Jersey is probably the leader in the illusory practice. However, New 
Jersey schools have retained as little as $7.50 for every $100 in Medicaid 
funds intended for school children.77 The GAO explains how the scheme 
works: 
[S]chool districts’ funds often are used to supply the state’s share of 
Medicaid funding for school-based claims. In these cases, the max-
imum additional funding that a school district can receive is what 
the federal government contributes. This is substantially less than 
what a private sector Medicaid provider would receive for deliver-
ing similar services. For example, a physician who submits a claim 
with an allowable amount of $100 will receive $100: $50 in state 
funds and $50 in federal funds in those states with equal matching 
between federal and state sources. Given the source of the states’ 
share of funding, states’ policies to retain portions of the federal re-
imbursement, and schools’ contingency fee arrangements with pri-
vate firms, the net amount of federal funds returned to a school dis-
trict varies considerably . . . [and may be] as little as $7.50 in New 
Jersey in federal Medicaid reimbursement for every $100 spent to 
pay for services and activities performed in support of Medicaid-
eligible children.78 
Governor Chris Christie hired a revenue maximization contractor to 
help continue the practice. The Public Consulting Group helps to run the 
“Special Education Medicaid Initiative” or SEMI.79 The SEMI program 
requires local New Jersey school districts to determine the maximum 
number of school children eligible for federal Medicaid funds. State doc-
uments illustrate the SEMI target revenue projections for the 2013–2014 
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school year.80 The Public Consulting Group determines the number of 
eligible children and plugs the children into a target revenue maximiza-
tion goal of at least eighteen services eligible for federal Medicaid 
funds.81 Below is the equation using the school children: 
Claimable Student Population x Annual Revenue per Student = District SEMI Revenue Projection82 
If schools do not meet the target goals for using school children to max-
imize federal Medicaid funds, they are punished by a reduction in school 
funding.83 Further, schools are required to obtain at least a ninety percent 
return rate seeking parents to consent to using their children in the pro-
cess.84 The revenue contractor explains best practices for maximizing 
parental consent, including that “[w]hen it comes to obtaining Parental 
Consent, districts sometimes need to be creative in their methods.”85 
In his FY 2013–2014 budget, Governor Christie explains how 82.5 
percent of the school-based Medicaid funds resulting from the SEMI 
program is routed away from special education services to his general 
coffers.86 The school districts only receive 17.5 percent of the federal aid 
intended to help them serve disabled children.87 Further, the revenue con-
tractor helps New Jersey with a Medicaid Administrative Claiming 
(MAC) initiative to increase claims for federal aid for school administra-
tive costs related to Medicaid services.88 Again, Christie diverts 82.5 per-
cent of the Medicaid funds to his general state revenue: 
40. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law or regulation to the 
contrary, each local school district that participates in the Medicaid 
Administrative Claiming (MAC) initiative shall receive a percent-
age of the federal revenue realized for current year claims. The per-
centage share shall be 17.5% of claims approved by the State by 
June 30.89 
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According to multiple federal audits, Christie’s use of revenue max-
imization contractors for school-based Medicaid funds has resulted in 
inappropriate claims. In a 2010 audit by the federal Office of Inspector 
General, considering school-based Medicaid funds that were claimed 
while using MAXIMUS as the revenue consultant, over half of the 
claims sampled were determined as “noncompliant.”90 New Jersey was 
asked to refund over $8 million in inappropriately claimed federal aid, 
but the Christie administration refused.91 In an audit of New Jersey’s 
school-based Medicaid claims when the Public Consulting Group was its 
revenue maximization contractor, thirty-six percent of the claims were 
noncompliant.92 Again, the Christie administration refused a request by 
the Office of Inspector General to return over $5.6 million in inappropri-
ately claimed federal aid.93 
As New Jersey diverts millions in school-based Medicaid funds 
away from schools, some school districts are so underfunded that they 
have resorted to selling the sides of school buses for advertisements.94 
The public affairs officer for the New Jersey School Boards Association 
explained that schools would rather not use such advertising, but they 
were desperately underfunded: 
In a perfect world, schools would be fully funded and school boards 
wouldn’t even have to think about programs like this . . . . But, these 
are difficult times for many school districts and sometimes a com-
munity expects their school board to look at all different options.”95 
While the states’ practices of funneling school-based Medicaid 
funds away from schools is troubling, fault also lies with the federal gov-
ernment. Needed oversight has been lacking and federal guidance is of-
ten vague at best. As the GAO explains, “[t]hese weak controls permit an 
environment for opportunism in which inappropriate claims could gener-
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ate excessive Medicaid payments.”96 Also, the use of revenue maximiza-
tion contractors “places these firms ‘in the driver’s seat,’ where they de-
sign the methods to claim administrative costs, train school personnel to 
apply these methods, and submit administrative claims to the state Medi-
caid agencies to obtain the federal reimbursement that provides the basis 
for their fees.”97 The financial incentive can encourage inappropriate 
claims: “By being able to capture a share of the school district’s federal 
payments, states and private firms are motivated to experiment with ‘cre-
ative’ billing practices.”98 
E. Nursing Home Revenue Maximization Strategies 
The Medicaid revenue strategies used by states and their contractors 
extend beyond the schemes using school children and impoverished in-
dividuals needing health care. Nursing home residents are also used as a 
means of leveraging more federal funds. This subpart describes how 
nursing homes are used in strategies similar to those discussed above, 
including IGTs, UPLs and bed taxes. Specific examples are examined in 
New York, Indiana and Maryland. Also, a strategy explaining how a mu-
nicipal agency purchased for-profit nursing homes to route Medicaid 
funds, intended for the nursing homes, to other purposes, is discussed in 
detail. 
1. Nursing Homes Used in IGT, UPL, and Bed Tax Schemes 
 States have been using nursing homes in IGT, UPL, and bed tax 
schemes for years, but these schemes are largely unknown or misunder-
stood by the public. As a result of the strategies, when states divert need-
ed Medicaid funds away from nursing homes to private profit and state 
revenue, the elderly poor often languish with inadequate care. 
As the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) explained in congressional testimony, some of 
the initial fiscal concerns with Medicaid revenue maximization strate-
gies: 
This is the most common method we have noted by which States 
divert funds from an intended purpose after drawing down the Fed-
eral share of the benefit. 
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States’ use of IGTs to divert funds has the following consequences: 
a State’s share of its Medicaid program inappropriately declines; 
Federal taxpayers pay more than their statutory share; and the in-
creased Federal Medicaid funding derived from those financing 
mechanisms becomes comingled in general revenue accounts, 
where it can be used for purposes unrelated to Medicaid, including 
as the State’s match to draw down more Federal dollars for Medi-
caid and other federally matched grant programs.99 
The OIG also explained how nursing homes lost needed (and in-
tended) funding as a result of the revenue schemes: “Some of our recent 
audits have explored States’ use of IGTs in which some or all of the 
Medicaid funds that were directed to local public nursing facilities as 
enhanced payments made under UPL rules were returned to the States 
instead of being retained at the facilities for the care of patients.”100 Harm 
resulted from the diversion of funds: 
In every case, we found that the gross Medicaid per diem and en-
hanced payments were sufficient to cover operating costs, but the 
net payments were not. The nursing facilities were required to re-
turn substantial portions of their enhanced payments to the States to 
be used for other purposes. As a result, the facilities were under-
funded. We believe this under funding had a negative impact on 
quality of care.101 
Therefore, as the OIG explained, the diversion of Medicaid funds results 
in insufficient funding for the nursing homes and poor quality of care. 
Multiple state examples are helpful to understand the practices and the 
impact. 
Beginning with New York, a 2013 national review of nursing home 
quality gave the state an overall “F” letter grade.102 New York is ranked 
45th in the country in terms of overall nursing home quality of care, and 
received multiple “F” grades regarding staffing levels: “Professional 
nursing services were almost nonexistent in New York’s nursing 
homes . . . .”103 
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Despite the need for more nursing home funding to improve quality 
of care, New York has been using its nursing homes in revenue schemes 
and diverting the funds. After setting its regular Medicaid payments 
much lower than what the nursing homes need, New York used the UPL 
strategy to make enhanced supplemental payments in order to trigger 
more federal funds, but forced the nursing homes to return up to ninety 
percent of the UPL funds.104 Two county nursing homes in New York 
illustrate the impact. 
The OIG reported how New York State and Albany County collab-
orated to use the Albany County Nursing Home to leverage and divert 
over $82 million in Medicaid dollars intended to serve the nursing home 
residents to the county and state general revenue funds.105 Following the 
details of the budgetary sleight of hand scheme, New York used $45.5 
million in county funds to make supplemental UPL payments—
triggering $45.5 million federal Medicaid matching payments.106 After 
initially paying the combined $91 million to the county nursing home 
operating bank account, the county transferred the $91 million out of the 
nursing home account to the county general fund.107 Then, the state took 
$36 million of the $91 million in Medicaid funds for state general reve-
nue—without spending a dime in state money.108 The county took back a 
little more than its original investment, leaving only $9.1 million for the 
nursing home system.109 
Because the Albany County nursing home system was forced to re-
turn ninety percent of the Medicaid payments that were intended for 
nursing home care, the nursing facility faced an operating budget short-
fall of about $22 million.110 The diversion of federal aid funds from the 
nursing home occurred despite the facility receiving an “immediate jeop-
ardy” rating by the state Department of Health.111 Due to the lack of 
funding, the nursing facility was not able to fill 90 needed nursing posi-
tions–contributing to the poor care.112 
In another New York example, the A. Holly Paterson Extended 
Care Facility was used in a similar scheme that caused the nursing facili-
ty to operate at a $25 million deficit.113 In a similar shifting of funds, the 
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state made $101.4 million in supplemental UPL nursing home Medicaid 
payments—using all county funds, and resulting in $101.4 million feder-
al Medicaid matching payments.114 New York again paid the combined 
$202.8 million to the county nursing home operating bank account.115 
The county shifted $182.5 million out of the nursing home account to the 
county general fund, the state took $81.1 million from the county general 
fund, and the nursing home was left with only ten percent of the Medi-
caid funds intended to help nursing home residents.116 
As with Albany County, harm resulted—one patient even died. 
New York was able to make greater UPL payments by keeping its regu-
lar daily state Medicaid payments to nursing homes at a low rate, in order 
to increase claims for federal Medicaid matching funds. Most of that fed-
eral aid was then diverted away from the nursing facility to state and 
county general revenue, while the A. Holly Patterson nursing facility 
received an “immediate jeopardy” rating by the state Department of 
Health.117 Further, due to deficiencies from the lack of funds, residents 
faced harm—including the death of a resident.118 The nursing facility 
faced insufficient funds and was unable to fill almost 100 needed nursing 
positions.119 
Like New York, unfortunately, Indiana also received an “F” grade 
for its nursing homes.120 In the 2013 report, Indiana was ranked 49th in 
overall quality of nursing home care, and almost ninety-four percent of 
the state’s nursing homes had deficiencies.121 Further, the GAO conclud-
ed in 2009 that Indiana had the “most poorly performing” nursing homes 
of any state in the country.122 A 2010 investigation by the Indianapolis 
Star determined that “the most critical caregivers are more scarce in In-
diana nursing homes than anywhere else.”123 According to the report, 
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“Indiana ranks 51st—lower than every other state and the District of Co-
lumbia—in the amount of time certified nursing assistants spend with 
residents.”124 
But an unfortunate trend continues. Despite deep concerns regard-
ing quality of care, Indiana has used revenue schemes to divert millions 
in federal Medicaid funds annually from nursing home care to its general 
funds. While its nursing homes struggle, Indiana and its revenue contrac-
tor have used the facilities to further its bed tax revenue strategies. Myers 
and Stauffer, L.C., contracted to help set the state’s Medicaid payment 
rates (including for nursing homes) and also to help with the state’s bed 
tax strategy.125 Under the bed tax, ironically called the “quality assess-
ment fee” or QAF, Indiana has diverted much of the resulting federal 
Medicaid funds into its general funds.126 The state used the strategy to 
divert $59.2 million in Medicaid funds from nursing homes to state gen-
eral funds in 2013,127 $36.6 million in 2012,128 $39.6 million in 2011,129 
and tens of millions annually for many years prior. 
Finally, although Maryland is one of the richest states in the coun-
try, the state received a “D” grade for nursing home quality of care—
virtually tied with Mississippi, the poorest state in the country.130 Mary-
land has been called “the worst nursing home state in the Mid-Atlantic 
Region.”131 Over ninety-five percent of the state’s nursing homes have 
deficiencies, and Maryland also received “D” grades in direct staffing 
hours and RN hours.132 
Yet again, despite the need to improve the funding and quality of 
care at Maryland’s nursing homes, the state has used its nursing facilities 
to divert a significant part of federal Medicaid funds to other state use. 
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Like other states, Maryland also uses nursing homes in a bed tax revenue 
strategy.133 The O’Malley administration doubled the bed tax from two 
percent to four percent in 2010, and changed the law to route up to thirty-
five percent of the Medicaid funds to state general funds.134 The admin-
istration then increased the tax again in 2011 to 5.5 percent, and up to six 
percent in 2012.135 
Prior to 2010, Maryland law provided that Medicaid funds claimed 
for nursing homes could only be used for nursing homes. The increased 
federal Medicaid funds could not be used to decrease state appropriations 
for nursing home care.136 The law required that federal aid from the bed 
tax strategy be used “only to fund reimbursements to nursing facilities 
under the Medicaid program” and that “the funds allocated by the De-
partment as reimbursements to nursing facilities under this section shall 
be in addition to and may not supplant funds already appropriated for this 
purpose.”137 However, 2010 legislation changed the requirement, allow-
ing for a significant amount of the aid to be diverted. The legislation ex-
plained that only “[a]t least 65% of the funds allocated by the Depart-
ment as reimbursements to nursing facilities under this section shall be in 
addition to and may not supplant funds already appropriated for this pur-
pose.”138 Therefore, up to thirty-five percent of the federal aid intended 
for nursing home care was freed up for other state use.139 
2. Municipal Agency Purchasing Nursing Homes to Take                   
Their Federal Aid 
The private sector has taken notice of the profit potential from pri-
vately run nursing homes—even lucrative investment firms such as the 
Carlyle Group. In 2007, the Carlyle Group acquired HCR Manor Care, 
one of the largest private operators of nursing homes in the United 
States, for $6.3 billion.140 
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According to the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Unin-
sured, “[r]esearch indicates that for-profit, or proprietary, facilities may 
have poorer performance on quality measures or lower staffing levels 
than non-profit or government facilities.”141 Further studies indicate that 
for-profit nursing homes more often prescribe antipsychotic drugs to 
nursing home residents, often to reduce staffing needs.142 
In Indiana, a municipal hospital agency also noticed the revenue 
potential from for-profit nursing homes. As explained above, Indiana 
nursing homes have received some of the worst quality ratings in the 
country.143 But when the hospital agency developed a scheme to buy up 
private nursing homes all across the state, the goal was diverting federal 
aid intended for the nursing homes to other uses, rather than improving 
quality of care. 
The agency involved in the nursing-home purchasing scheme is the 
Health and Hospital Corporation (HHC), a municipal agency that oper-
ates the Marion County Health Department and hospital system (which 
includes Indianapolis).144 HHC was operating at a $30 million annual 
deficit in the early 2000s.145 State legislators urged the agency to look for 
ways to help maximize federal funds to offset state and local government 
costs, and HHC accordingly worked with the state human services agen-
cy on revenue strategies.146 And HHC found a target revenue source: 
low-income, elderly residents in for-profit nursing homes across Indiana. 
To implement its revenue strategy, the agency started buying 
for-profit nursing homes, not just near Indianapolis where the agency is 
located, but all across the state. The agency worked with state officials to 
turn poor-performing nursing homes into a revenue opportunity, taking 
advantage of federal Medicaid funding policies.147 After the federal gov-
ernment determines maximum payment amounts for federal Medicaid 
matching payments, states can decide what nursing home facilities 
should receive the maximum payments.148 Using that discretion, Indiana 
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enacted legislation determining that the state’s government-owned nurs-
ing homes would receive higher Medicaid payments.149 The bill allowed 
“the Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning (OMPP) to increase Medi-
caid reimbursement rates for government-owned and operated nursing 
facilities to the extent allowed by federal statutes and regulations.” 150 
Analysis of the legislation explains the intent was to maximize fed-
eral Medicaid funds: 
In addition, the bill requires that each governmental transfer or other 
nursing home payment mechanism that OMPP implements must 
maximize the amount of federal financial participation that the state 
can obtain. This provision can be interpreted as requiring the state 
to investigate and implement alternative means of leveraging feder-
al dollars through the Medicaid program potentially increasing fed-
eral reimbursement with little or no additional state funding.151 
The goal was clear. Purchase nursing homes so they are government-
owned, which would lead to an increase in federal Medicaid funds. Then, 
route the money to other uses, rather than to nursing home care. 
Some legislators in Indiana tried to protect the funds for nursing 
homes. The state’s house and senate passed a different bill requiring that 
federal aid from the revenue strategies using nursing homes must be used 
for the nursing homes: “All money used to generate additional federal 
financial participation under this chapter through an intergovernmental 
transfer or other payment mechanism and any additional payments that 
are received by the state through an intergovernmental transfer or other 
payment mechanism under this chapter shall be distributed to Medicaid 
nursing facilities.”152 Unfortunately, then-Governor Frank O’Bannon 
vetoed the legislative effort,153 and Governors Joe Kernan, Mitch Dan-
iels, and Mike Pence allowed the strategy to continue, buying up nursing 
homes to leverage and divert federal aid. 
Once legislation was enacted, HHC started searching for for-profit 
nursing homes to use in its strategy and purchased its first twelve in 
2003.154 Operating in the Indianapolis hospital system, the agency should 
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have been focused on improving quality of care of its health facilities, 
but according to reports, HHC was primarily focused on increasing cash 
flow. When the agency started purchasing the nursing facilities, it did not 
actually take over operations. Rather, HHC simply bought the nursing 
home licenses, leased the properties from the private companies that 
owned the rights, and then hired a private company to operate the nurs-
ing homes.155 American Senior Communities was the company running 
the private nursing homes prior to the initial HHC purchases in 2003, and 
after the purchases HHC hired the same company to keep operating 
them.156 
Although HHC is located solely in Indianapolis, the agency pur-
chased nursing home licenses across the state in twenty-two counties.157 
As of 2013, HHC has purchased fifty-nine for-profit nursing homes as 
part of its strategy.158 And after the purchases, an investigation showed 
that HHC did not improve the quality of care in the facilities. The con-
tract HHC initiated with the private nursing home operators included no 
requirements regarding staffing levels, and no standards or incentives 
regarding quality of care.159 The Indianapolis Star reported that as of 
2010, “[t]en of the 17 homes HHC purchased in 2003 have worse state 
report card scores.”160 Further, in “recent nationwide federal five-star 
rankings, 16 of the 27 HHC homes purchased through 2008—those HHC 
has owned the longest—received the lowest rating possible.”161 The in-
vestigation also determined that the “amount of time residents in HHC 
nursing homes receive from nursing aides is lower than the statewide 
average, [a]nd Indiana is 51st in the U.S., after all 50 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in staffing levels for the aides.”162 But despite con-
cerns, the president and executive director of HHC contended that more 
nursing staff would not necessarily improve care—an argument that de-
fies common sense as well as expert opinions that one of the key 
measures of nursing home quality of care is nursing staff ratios.163 
HHC claimed ownership in order to trigger higher federal Medicaid 
payments for government-owned nursing facilities, despite the fact that 
the agency did not actually operate the nursing homes. But regardless of 
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the illusory nature of the strategy, HHC purports to have a mission to 
serve the public health and the interests of its beneficiaries: “to promote 
and protect the health of everyone in the community and provide health 
care to those who are underserved.”164 Adhering to that mission, the 
agency should have used any federal aid claimed on behalf of nursing 
homes, especially nursing homes providing poor quality care, to improve 
the services for the nursing home residents. But unfortunately, improving 
nursing home care has not been HHC’s motive. 
When HHC buys a for-profit nursing home, the purchase can im-
mediately lead to an additional $55 in federal Medicaid payments per 
day per nursing home resident.165 The agency then has diverted most of 
the extra money away from the nursing homes, using the funds for other 
purposes such as a new $750 million dollar hospital complex.166 Indiana 
and HHC have viewed the strategy as successful, providing for addition-
al federal funds that were routed to build a new hospital system without 
the otherwise required increase in property taxes or state and local spend-
ing.167 But for the residents of the nursing homes, the strategy has not 
been successful. As HHC bought up the nursing homes, the agency left 
the residents in poor care while their federal aid was diverted.168 When 
asked about the practices, a professor of bioethics explained the immo-
rality of HHC actions: “As a general moral principal when dealing with 
vulnerable persons, your first duty is to make sure they have adequate 
protection and services that meet their needs . . . .”169 
HHC used the federal aid funds it routed from the nursing home 
residents to build a new $750 million dollar hospital complex.170 HHC 
named the complex Eskenazi Health in recognition of a real estate devel-
oper’s $40 million donation.171 But much more of the money came from 
HHC taking aid from nursing home residents. By 2010, HHC obtained 
$218 million through its revenue strategy, and the cash flow increased to 
$104 million annually by 2012.172 The HHC scheme of buying up nurs-
ing homes to divert their federal aid resulted in quite the hospital system: 
Indiana has never seen a hospital quite like this.  
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From the spiraling wooden sculpture suspended from the ceil-
ing in the main concourse to the vegetable garden on the roof, the 
brand-new Eskenazi Hospital keeps you wondering what you will 
see around the next corner. 
. . . . 
Up on the rooftop, a 5,000-square-foot “Sky Farm” features a 
produce and flower garden laid out in neat rows. A nearby shed is 
filled with gardening tools. Patients and employees will be able to 
plant and pick fruits, vegetables and flowers, or just sit on a bench 
and gaze at the horizon.173 
Resulting from their $40 million donation, HHC put a sculpture of 
Mr. Eskenazi and his wife in the hospital’s main concourse.174 The presi-
dent of HHC explained that in making the hospital system “beautiful and 
unique,” “we didn’t want to forget our history,” and “[w]e want to look 
forward while honoring where we came from.”175 But providing a differ-
ent view of where the hospital system came from, the long-term-care 
policy director for United Senior Action explained, “They are funding 
this hospital literally on the backs of these [nursing home] residents.”176 
Through the practice, HHC built a new hospital complex, and companies 
running the nursing homes were able to profit.177 The strategy also re-
sulted in arguable benefit to many taxpayers by avoiding the property 
taxes that would have otherwise been required to fund the project.178 But 
while ownership of the nursing homes and federal aid was shifted 
around, and everyone else seemed to benefit, the nursing home residents 
were still trapped in poor care. 
F. Audits Unable to Keep Up with the Schemes 
The strategies discussed in this Article are not new, and the federal 
government is often aware of them. At times, federal agencies and the 
executive branch have tried to clamp down on the illusory practices. 
However, as soon as the federal government tries to restrict one type of 
practice, the states and their contractors seem to invent another to con-
stantly stay one step ahead. Federal regulatory attempts have occurred 
multiple times, including a federal regulation requiring improved trans-
parency and accountability requirements for DSH payments that are of-
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ten used in the revenue strategies.179 In addition to the regulations, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes cuts to federal DSH 
payments, because the payments should be less necessary as more of the 
previously uninsured have access to health insurance.180 
However, the federal government’s attempts have not addressed 
another category of “non-DSH supplemental payments.”181 As traditional 
DSH payments may become less available, states have increased their 
targeting of the non-DSH supplemental payments as another source of 
revenue strategies. According to the GAO, the federal Medicaid match-
ing non-DSH supplemental Medicaid payments grew by over $8 billion 
from 2006 to 2010.182 Of those payments, $2.3 billion was claimed by 
only one state—Texas.183 
Despite the attempts by the federal government to reduce other 
forms of Medicaid revenue strategies, the revenue maximization schemes 
and diversion of federal aid have continued. For example, the budget es-
timates for Indiana show $58 million from the state’s disproportionate 
share hospital program going into the general fund each year for FY 
2012 and FY 2013.184 In North Carolina, the general fund budget docu-
ments for FY 2012 and FY 2013 include $115 million in funds generated 
from the disproportionate share program each year.185 In Texas, federal 
aid from the disproportionate share program is considered by the state as 
non-tax revenue that is “available for general purpose spending.”186 The 
Texas budget estimate explains: “With respect to federal payments, Gen-
eral Revenue-related revenues from the Disproportionate Share Program, 
which helps pay for indigent care at state and local hospitals and the 
closely related Upper Payment Limit Program . . . are expected to total 
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$669 million in 2012-13.”187 California will likely claim more than Indi-
ana, North Carolina, and Texas combined, using just a bed tax on hospi-
tals. Legislation enacted in 2013 extends the bed tax on hospitals for 
three years, and plans for the resulting federal Medicaid funds included 
shifting the money into state general revenue: 
In 2013, the fee raised $3 billion. The state received $620 mil-
lion, some $40 million went to hospitals as grants and the remainder 
was used as leverage to attract an additional $1.9 billion in federal 
funds . . . . 
It is estimated that extending that fee for three more years be-
ginning next year will generate $3 billion for the state’s General 
Fund . . . .188 
Further, Florida has not backed off from using intergovernmental 
transfers (IGTs) to save state general revenue—including over $880 mil-
lion in just one year: 
Over the years the amount of dollars that have been used for these 
activities has grown substantially. A significant portion of the fund-
ing in the Medicaid budget for hospitals for inpatient and outpatient 
services is funded by IGT’s in lieu of state general revenue funds. 
For FY 2009-2010, there was $880,351,951 in IGTs in the Florida 
Medicaid budget.189 
III. CONFLICT WITH STATUTORY PURPOSE 
The Medicaid revenue maximization strategies undermine the core 
statutory purpose of the Medicaid program. When Congress enacted the 
Medicaid program in 1965, the purpose was not to simply give the states 
money to replace their spending on health care services for the poor. Nor 
was the purpose to give states billions in federal funds that they could 
just route to their general funds for any state purpose. With the Medicaid 
program, Congress sought to create a partnership between the federal 
government and the states, including shared financing, “so as to make 
medical services for the needy more generally available.”190 
When first enacted, Congress included a maintenance of state effort 
provision to assure that the federal funds, “which are to accrue to the 
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States under the operation of the formula described above, shall be used 
directly in the public assistance program and may not be withdrawn from 
the program by the States.”191 Even though the provision has not contin-
ued into the current statutory language, the provision’s inclusion at the 
Medicaid program’s beginning clearly shows the intended purpose feder-
al Medicaid funds—to combine the federal spending with state spending 
to attain increased funding for medical services for the poor. 
State use of the Medicaid funds must be consistent with states’ 
Medicaid plans.192 States receiving federal Medicaid payments must 
“provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and 
the payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . to assure 
that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of 
care.”193 And the Medicaid program is structured with the intent to incen-
tivize states to provide more Medicaid services. The federal payments 
are provided as a match to state spending.194 The more states spend on 
Medicaid services, the more federal matching payments the states can 
claim. 
The federal matching payments are considered federal financial 
participation. This FFP structure assumes that both the federal govern-
ment and states will pay a matching percentage of the total Medicaid 
spending. The federal payments are clearly intended to supplement, not 
replace, the state spending. Thus, in the revenue strategies explained 
through this Article, when federal Medicaid matching payments are in-
stead claimed through illusory schemes where no state spending actually 
occurs, and if the federal payments are just used to bolster state general 
revenue rather than for Medicaid services, the statutory purpose and in-
tended structure of the federal payments are undermined. 
CONCLUSION: RESTORING PURPOSE TO THE MEDICAID PROGRAM 
To be clear, the answer to state practices of diverting Medicaid 
funds is not to make cuts to the Medicaid program. The answer is to stop 
the misuse of aid funds so vulnerable populations receive the assistance 
they desperately need. 
When states hire private contractors to help use illusory revenue 
strategies to maximize federal Medicaid matching funds with no corre-
sponding state spending, and states divert the federal aid to general cof-
fers, the intended collaboration between the federal government and 
states in running and financing the Medicaid program is destroyed. The 
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solution is not difficult to understand. The core statutory purpose and 
structure of the Medicaid program must be protected to restore integrity 
to the program, to reduce states’ misuse of billions in taxpayer dollars, 
and to ensure vulnerable children and adults receive the Medicaid ser-
vices they desperately need. 
When states claim federal Medicaid matching payments intended to 
increase Medicaid services, the states must not be allowed to redirect the 
funds to bolster their general state funds. Maintenance of effort require-
ments,195 or “supplement, not supplant”196 limitations, should be imposed 
on states and monitored. 
States must be held accountable when Medicaid funds are diverted 
contrary to statutory purpose. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) can strengthen its efforts under existing statutory author-
ity to ensure to protect the integrity of the Medicaid program, and such 
authority must be exercised. The federal statute requiring “efficiency, 
economy and quality of care” is interpreted as providing CMS with 
broad authority to restrict state practices that conflict with the statutory 
purpose.197 CMS can deny proposed state Medicaid plans that are incon-
sistent with the statutory purposes. The agency should also use the au-
thority to better monitor and restrict the state diversion of federal Medi-
caid payments. CMS could require states that misuse the federal aid—
those who route the funds to general state coffers—to redirect the federal 
aid to assist the intended benefits. And if a revenue contractor knowingly 
encourages or carries out illusory revenue practices that conflict with the 
statutory framework, the companies should be investigated under False 
Claims Act provisions and possibly blocked from future contracts with 
the federal aid programs.198 
Further, in addition to improving the integrity of state actions in 
their claims for federal Medicaid dollars, the federal government should 
also improve the process for claiming the funds. The federal regulations 
can be further clarified, improving the process to ensure that the statutory 
purposes of the Medicaid program are carried out. For example, to ad-
dress states’ use of illusory UPL supplemental payment strategies, the 
federal government should not reduce the upper payment limits but ra-
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ther further clarify (and enforce) that any federal Medicaid funds claimed 
as a result of supplemental payments must be used for the intended Med-
icaid purposes. 
Increased federal audits may be necessary to better police the ac-
tions of states and their contractors. But the federal government should 
reduce its own reliance on private contractors in the auditing process. 
Currently, contractors are being hired by the federal government to 
monitor the actions of contractors hired by the state governments. Medi-
caid contractors are assisting states in maximizing claims for federal aid 
while simultaneously working for the federal government to reduce pay-
out of the same federal dollars. Making money both coming and going is 
certainly profitable for the contractors, but is harmful to fiscal federal-
ism’s hopes for harmonious collaboration between the federal and state 
governments. 
Continued debate should consider possible structural changes to 
further reduce the misuse of aid funds, ranging from improvements to the 
current matching grant structure to complete federalization. Proposals to 
convert the Medicaid program into part of the current Medicare program 
would certainly reduce the diversion of federal aid, as states would no 
longer operate the program and the federal matching grant structure 
would be replaced with direct federal financing.199 At the other end of the 
spectrum, proposals to restructure Medicaid by giving all the money to 
states, and letting them figure out the best use, would likely worsen the 
problems. For example, in the “flex fund” proposal by Senator Marcus 
Rubio, he seeks to consolidate most federal aid funds and hand over all 
the money to states as flexible funds to use as they wish.200 Likewise, 
Congressman Paul Ryan’s “opportunity grant” proposes to terminate the 
current safety net programs and just give all the money to the states.201 
The argument for such block grant proposals is that, because states are 
better able to understand the needs of their residents, the states should 
have complete access and control over the federal aid dollars. But the 
theory is glaringly flawed. 
Despite layers of regulations and multiple federal audits in the 
Medicaid program, states and their revenue maximization consultants 
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seek out loopholes and illusory schemes to maximize and divert the aid 
to other uses. Removing all federal oversight, and just giving the money 
to the states, would only ensure that less of the federal aid gets to those in 
need. Considering Romney’s Medicaid maximization strategies dis-
cussed earlier in this Article, “It’s not hard to imagine how a governor—
one that employs complex shell games to find loopholes in federal rules 
in order to maximize and divert federal aid—would use the federal funds 
if handed to the state without any federal oversight.”202 When states mis-
use federal aid, the response should not be to give those states even more 
flexibility to use the money however they want. Rather, we must take 
further steps to improve the claiming process, clarify statutory and regu-
latory language, close loopholes, and increase federal monitoring to end 
the illusory revenue schemes—to begin ensuring that simple but crucial-
ly important goal that Medicaid funds are used as intended, for Medicaid 
services. 
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